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“Three periods must be distinguished with respect to every war: its inception;
its prosecution, before victory is gained; and the period after victory.”
— Francisco Suarez

O

n 13 November 2001, President George W. Bush, in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief, issued an order that would allow suspected foreign terrorists to be tried by US military tribunals.1 At the time, Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld stated that he had not yet had a chance to fully research the legal and practical ramifications of implementing such proceedings. But resort to
military tribunal, which has a long history of customary use in the United States
dating back to the American Revolution (see Madson v. Kinsella, 1952), has been
considered by the Supreme Court (Ex Parte Quirin, 1942; Application of
Yamashita, 1946), and ruled to be an appropriate venue for the trial of non-citizen
belligerents accused of offenses against the law of war. It is the considered opinion of many military legal experts that the Supreme Court would affirm the constitutionality of such use of military commissions in the context of the current
war on terrorism, together with the rules for them promulgated by Secretary
Rumsfeld, if and when this question ever comes before it.2 Nevertheless, the issue of military commissions is already on trial in the court of public opinion,
where it is widely assumed that the projected effects of this order on American
security and civil liberties will be largely negative.3
Even before the events of 11 September 2001 provided the impetus for
the President’s order, the apprehension of Slobodan Milosevic had already
brought our role in international war crimes tribunals into question.4 Arguments
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against our participation in such proceedings have been advanced to the effect that
it is disingenuous to imagine that the rule of law applies to warfare; that war crimes
tribunals serve only to enforce “victor’s justice” on those whose only real crime
was having had the bad moral luck to be raised in a society that approved of genocide and other crimes against humanity, or to have served in a military that engaged in war crimes; that war crimes “show trials” cannot undo past wrongs, nor
can laying blame further peace and reconciliation; that international jurisdiction
over war criminals threatens national sovereignty; and that trumped-up charges
and unfair trials in “kangaroo courts” might be used as a means for disgruntled
weaker nations to take out their resentments on the soldiers of more powerful ones.
In essence, these objections break down into arguments that war crimes
trials are either philosophically or procedurally flawed, or impracticable. Some
of these objections, like those based on cultural relativism, the supposed impossibility of imposing the rule of law on warfare, or “bad moral luck” are specious.
Others, like concerns for sovereignty and the fairness of both accusations and
judgments handed down by war crimes tribunals, raise serious legal and practical
concerns, but do not necessarily constitute sufficient reason for us to categorically absent ourselves from these proceedings. I argue, to the contrary, that the
meting out of punishment for crimes against humanity and war crimes, whether
in international tribunals or in our own civil courts, courts-martial, or military tribunals, is in fact the natural, logical, and morally indispensable end stage of Just
War. If Just War is undertaken to right wrongs done by a group or groups of people to another—if in fact the only acceptable reason for going to war is, as Michael Walzer5 and other Just War theorists contend, to do justice—then stopping
short of trying and punishing those most responsible for war crimes and crimes
against humanity which either led to war or were committed in its prosecution
may be likened to declaring “checkmate” and then declining to take your opponent’s king. It makes no strategic sense, since the purpose for which war was undertaken is never achieved. It makes no legal sense, since the criminal activities
the war was undertaken to rectify or curtail are allowed to continue unchecked.
What is worse, it makes no moral sense, since justice is not done for the victims of
atrocities in such an outcome to war.
Declining to do full justice for those who have been most grievously
wronged by aggression, whether from without or within their national borders,
leads to the perpetration of further moral injustice on both the victims of war
crimes and on innocents among the criminals’ countrymen, ethnic group, or
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co-religionists. In the case of the victims of atrocities, sweeping these injustices
under a thick dusty rug of history, whether to keep a fragile peace or in a foredoomed effort at reconciliation, only continues their abusive treatment as nonpersons who do not even register on the radar screen of international justice. Given
no legitimate forum where their justified moral outrage is vented on the criminals
most responsible for their suffering, victims too often become victimizers, taking
out their anger and frustration indiscriminately and disproportionately on anyone
who looks, sounds, or smells like their abusers, without benefit of trial.6
If we do nothing to prevent such illegal and immoral outcomes to Just
War, then the natural and foreseeable consequences that follow from warfare
may negate its justness as much as if it had been unjustly declared or unjustly
waged. The crux of my argument is that there is a third pillar to Just War, which I
will call “jus post bellum” or justice in the wake of war, that should be considered
along with jus ad bellum and jus in bello, so that the resulting tripod may support
a more stable just peace.

Warfare, Law, and Doing Justice
Just War theory is customarily characterized as resting upon two mutually supportive pillars—jus ad bellum or justice in going to war, and jus in bello
or justice in waging war. Both of these concepts have gone through a long and tortuous evolution from Biblical scripture, through Greek philosophy, Roman Jus
Gentium, and Christian (via Roman Catholic) theology, to the secular law of
armed conflict. Some of the jus in bello injunctions enumerated in Deuteronomy
20:10-20,7 for example, not to mention the jus ad bellum criteria of taking land
and disseminating religion, would no longer be considered acceptable under the
modern secular international law of war. But in the Biblical specification of conditions for, and in, warfare, within the body of religious law, is the germ of the application of secular national and international law to warfare. Central to this
concept is the purpose of law with respect to warfare, which is to translate the
moral abstraction of justice into some concrete reality secured by force.
The linkage between the moral ideal of justice and the practical agencies of warfare and national and international law was implicit in Plato’s discussion of jus ad bellum and jus in bello conditions in his Republic8 and Laws.9 That
connection was made explicit in the term “Just War” (Bellum Justum) coined by
Aristotle,10 and by the inclusion of jus ad bellum and jus in bello under the rubric
of Just War. The just use of force requires both justification and limitations, and
the specification and enforcement of both is the purview of law.
Together, justice in going to war and justice in waging war are traditionally presented as both necessary and sufficient to set conditions during two critical
times when hostile nations must take scrupulous care to do justice. The first of
these times is before formal hostilities have begun, when the decision to go to war
is being made. Jus ad bellum criteria have varied throughout a long evolution. But
already in first century B.C. Rome, Cicero had narrowed down acceptable cassi
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belli, or causes for war, to defense of the honor or safety of what he called “the
ideal state,” flatly stating that “those wars which are unjust are undertaken without
provocation, for only a war waged for revenge [in the sense, as I read it, of retributive justice] or defense can be just.”11 Fittingly, it was St. Ambrose, who was Roman governor of northern Italy before becoming Bishop of Milan, who explicitly
related the secular legal considerations governing warfare under Roman Jus
Gentium to the moral constraints placed on warfare by Christian theology, through
the cardinal virtues, chief of which he considered to be justice.12 This same thread
of moral justification runs in the opposite direction from the Augustinian specification, grounded in Christian theology, that war be fought only with right intention
to Hugo Grotius’s secular legal requirement that nations have a just cause for going to war. Wars have been, and still are, fought for “elbow room,” natural resources, political hegemony, ethnic or religious dominance, etc. But, in its strict
modern construction, just war may be undertaken primarily, if not solely, as a
means of redressing wrongs inflicted on innocents, or to force an aggressor to
cease and desist from inflicting harm, especially when negotiation and other
means short of war have failed.13 The difference between these and other causes or
intentions such as those listed above is a matter of justice, informed by ethics.
The second time when justice ought to be done is throughout the conduct
of war itself. It is these jus in bello considerations that govern rules of engagement
by setting limits on the targets and means of justly waged war. Military realists
have long argued that such rules do not apply under conditions of combat, predictably quoting Cicero’s most famous dictum, “Silent enim leges inter arma” (“In
time of war, the law falls silent”)14 or misquoting William Tecumseh Sherman to
the effect that “War is Hell” to support this cynical and dangerous proposition. To
baldly assert that “war is cruelty and you cannot refine it” is dangerous, because it
covers a cynical dismissal of action that could save countless lives and prevent untold suffering. And the reasoning leading to this cynical conclusion—that nothing
need be done to mitigate the horrors of war because nothing can be done—is demonstrably false. It flies in the face of centuries of experimentation and success in
both the development and application of Just War theory.
Moreover, such appeals to Cicero and Sherman are either taken out of
context or stretch the intended sense of those authors’ statements. For one thing, it
is difficult to reconcile the author of such statements as “there are certain duties
that we owe even to those who have wronged us . . . [and] there is a limit to retribution and punishment”15 with a flippant dismissal of jus in bello restrictions. That
“in war the laws are silent” seems, on closer inspection, to be Cicero’s legal advice
to his fellow citizens that they accept certain provisions in the Roman constitution
temporarily limiting their civil rights in time of war,16 much as we have been forced
to accept certain limitations on our liberties for security’s sake since 9/11. What it
does not seem to be is an argument for the suspension of the law of war. Sherman
himself made just such an effort at the refinement of warfare as he claimed to be
impossible when he issued the order for the evacuation of Atlanta before burning
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the city. His justification of that order to General Hood, the Confederate commander there—“God will judge whether it be more humane to fight with a town
full of women at our back or remove them in time to places of safety among their
own friends and people”—reads very like an argument for discrimination of civilians from combatants, one of the twin pillars of jus in bello. Sherman also argued
that because the South had started the Civil War, it had little right to complain
about any hardships the Union visited on its people as a result. I will return to the
vexed problem of collective guilt later in this article. But my point here is that even
the author of perhaps the most (mis)quoted justification for modern military realism recognized the existence of moral principles that ought to apply in wartime.
A related notion—that because in every war there are some soldiers
who do not abide by these principles, rule of law is therefore impossible in wartime, and all other soldiers are, on account of the criminality of the few, released
from their professional jus in bello obligations—also fails to convince. This idea
is based on the proposition that if a law is broken, it must be because it is impossible to obey. This, too, is demonstrably false, for in every war, on every side, there
are many more soldiers who somehow manage to serve honorably than there are
perpetrators of war crimes. Moreover, soldiers can and do accomplish their missions and win wars while fighting within the limitations of the law of land and
aerial warfare; indeed, not doing so in this age of televised warfare may, in fact,
prove counterproductive to the achievement of one’s national war aims.17 From a
legal standpoint, it is patently absurd to hold that laws should apply only so long
as nobody breaks them.18 A body of law consisting only of rules no citizen would
ever break would be superfluous at best. At worst, it would be vicious in the Aristotelian sense of being full of vice. For even if some irrational society were to exist in which no law its people broke remained in effect, such a state of de facto
lawlessness would still be immoral because of the injuries and injustices it would
allow to be perpetrated on innocents.
By any moral reasoning one can marshal, law—the purpose of which is
to do justice, in part by punishing violators of others’ national, international, and
natural human rights—can and does have a great deal to say on the subject of war.
Its voice can be muted by vicious acts of governments, and vicious or just plain
morally lazy peoples can and do turn a deaf ear to its requirements. But because
the consequences of making no effort to limit the depredations of warfare are so
terrible, war is the one place where law must be allowed to speak the loudest.

Jus Post Bellum, the Third Leg of the Just War Tripod
Together with jus ad bellum considerations, the jus in bello principles
of discrimination of civilians from combatants and proportionality of means are
generally presented as an exhaustive listing of the components of Just War. There
is, however, as Francisco Suarez observed, a third point in the waging of war
when justice should be done, and that is when a justly declared and justly fought
war is over (jus post bellum).19 Once hostilities have ceased, those most grievAutumn 2002
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ously harmed have a natural right to some reasonable expectation that a just society (and, by extension, the civilized nations or the world, if they wish to be
thought just) acknowledge the fact that atrocious crimes have been perpetrated
on them, and fairly judge and exact punishment from the perpetrators. Societies
that are wise, as well as just, will see to it that these expectations are met.
In another paper related to this article, I assessed the culpability for war
crimes and consequent liability for punishment of all three kinds of bad actors
distinguished by Aristotle in his Nichomachean Ethics—the morally weak; the
preferentially immoral, or wicked; and the morally deficient brute.20 It has become the fashion among indicted war criminals to claim membership in the third
of these categories. As moral deficients, they then invoke their “bad moral luck”
in having grown up in the poisonously anti-social atmosphere of a Nazi Germany
(or Milosevic’s Serbia, or apartheid-era South Africa, or a Palestinian village on
the west bank of the Jordan)—circumstances in which they had no choice—as an
exculpatory excuse for their participation in atrocities. One can, however, recognize the corrupting influence of an evil society on character without necessarily
accepting it as sufficient reason to excuse an individual’s evil actions.21
Paul Christopher writes that Hugo Grotius, father of the international law
of war, “argues that to participate in a crime a person must not only have knowledge of it but also have the opportunity to prevent it.”22 “The problem,” as David
Cooper points out, “is that if the ideology [of an evil society] were that powerful,
nearly everyone would have gone along with its dictates.”23 This proposition, like
the one that warfare is unrefinable cruelty, is demonstrably untrue. Members of
even the worst of the above-mentioned evil societies, Nazi Germany, contrived to
do good in the face of socially condoned and sponsored evil, proving that it was indeed possible for ordinary German citizens to both know and do better than commit atrocities. In the final analysis, unless one had been raised in the woods by
wolves, a claim to innocence of atrocities by virtue of socially acquired brutishness reduces to nothing more extenuating than the old “but everybody else was doing it” defense, cynically—and therefore knowingly—presented as moral
philosophy. Even the willfully self-delusional brute knows the crimes he commits
to be evil, but he convinces himself, or allows himself to be convinced, of the outrageous fiction that they are not, in order to facilitate the commission of his crimes;
as such, he is not the ignorant brute he claims to be, but preferentially wicked, and
so he is responsible for the harm he does.
If the morally weak, the preferentially wicked, the cynically self-styled
brute, and even the self-delusioned brute are responsible for the harm caused by
their part in planning, directing, carrying out, advocating, or tolerating crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and atrocities, then it follows by moral reasoning that
they may be held criminally liable for punishment for the infliction of that harm.
Ideally, all of them ought to be punished to the extent that they have taken part in the
perpetration of crimes against humanity. In actuality, time and funds for the investigation and trial of war criminals are limited, but those most responsible among
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“To shrink from condemning and punishing
atrocity is, however tacitly, to condone evil.”

them—the Hitlers, the Goerings, the Pol Pots, the Milosevics, the Karadzics, and
other architects of genocide—at the very least, must be punished. The reasons have
to do with the relationship of Just War and the law of war to the doing of justice.
To shrink from condemning and punishing atrocity is, however tacitly, to
condone evil. To allow evil to be done is itself an evil. It is to add insult to injury by
trivializing, sometimes to the point of utterly denying, the injury suffered by the
victims of atrocities. It is to side with criminals against their victims, judging the
wronged unworthy of justice while holding those who wronged them above it. On
the most fundamental of moral principles, it is unjust. And for a society (or a community of nations) to work such an injustice in the name of its citizens is to wrong
the righteous among them as well. The proper venue for doing this kind of justice
in the wake of war is in properly constituted and conducted war crimes tribunals.
It has been argued that the cause of peace and reconciliation is not served
by the laying of blame and the meting out of punishment in war crimes tribunals.24
Considering the inhumane deeds and irreparable harm done by war criminals, it is
the height of presumption to imagine that their victims should ever forgive them.25
In any case, it is not the purpose of Just War to force reconciliation of the victims of
war crimes with their abusers.26 The establishment of lasting peace is better served
by the doing of justice in the wake of war. The doing of that particular form of justice by recognizing and publicly placing blame on those most clearly responsible
for atrocities and exacting fair retribution is the purpose of war crimes tribunals.
That there be some formal avenue for doing this sort of justice, and that it be done
in such a way that the victims accept as just, is absolutely necessary in order to prevent the wholesale assigning of collective guilt to, and the taking of indiscriminate
and disproportional revenge on, the possibly innocent families, associates, and
countrymen of war criminals by their victims, which can only guarantee further
warfare and the perpetration of further war crimes.
The subject of collective guilt is one that most Just War theorists would
prefer not to confront. I see it as a doomsday machine that could bring about the
end of the Just War tradition, and, with it, all efforts to mitigate the worst cruelties
of warfare. For collective guilt, in diametric opposition to Just War, is based on the
presumption of universal guilt. The proponents of collective guilt do not burden
their fighters with demands that they make vital moral decisions on the battlefield.
Some Vietnam War veterans I have spoken with, and also some cadets I
have instructed in the law of war, have argued that the loosening of legal and moral
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restrictions on the treatment of nominal civilians who act as soldiers but claim civilian immunity may offer the only practicable way of countering guerrilla warfare.27 For their part, guerrillas claim (quite disingenuously, since guerrilla
strategy is organically dependent upon the deliberate blurring of the line Just War
tradition draws between combatants and civilians) that such dishonorable tactics
represent their only means of standing up to more powerful nations. But to the extent that nominal civilians increasingly play some part in modern warfare, their
specially protected status is increasingly eroded. In the absence of the protections
civilian status provides noncombatants, all enemy civilians—young “men” well
below any reasonable draft age, women, babies, medical personnel, clergy, the elderly, and incapacitated hospital patients—may be indiscriminately targeted; the
wounded may be bayoneted on the battlefield rather than taken prisoner since there
is no specially protected status for those rendered hors de combat; and POWs may
be tortured and murdered since their captors will no longer be under any legal or
moral obligation to treat them humanely. Indeed, indiscriminate revenge-taking of
the universally guilty upon the universally guilty will not provide the stabilizing
influence of jus post bellum, but a never-ending casus belli. And inch by inch, we
shall all be dragged backwards into Hobbes’s nightmare “natural” state of “combat of all against all,” where life will indeed be “nasty, brutish, and short.”
Just War advocates are driven by a desperate desire to prevent such horror. But apologists for the 9/11 attacks and other acts of terrorism have no such
compunctions about assigning collective guilt, and have enthusiastically embraced this immoral practice. Osama bin Laden, in a widely aired videotape,
claimed legitimacy for his deliberate targeting of the World Trade Center, in
which thousands of civilians worked, on the grounds that it supported American
economic power. “The American people,” bin Laden declared, “should remember that they pay taxes. . . . They are,” therefore, on the grounds of the collective
guilt he and other militant Islamic fanatics indiscriminately assign them, “responsible for American policy,” and so are deserving of the indiscriminate terror
attacks he admitted ordering against them. In return, the hearts of many American citizens were hardened toward all people of Middle Eastern descent by bin
Laden’s obvious pleasure in the death of innocents, by the destruction he caused,
and by the sight of beaming Palestinians dancing in the streets at the news of
attacks on America, whether they felt free to publicly admit it to microphonewielding newsmen or not. Unfortunately, Arab-Americans do have reason to
worry about the consequences to them of bin Laden’s atrocities. Their best hope
for a peaceful future in this country resides in their increasingly mistrustful
neighbors seeing justice done to bin Laden and his lieutenants for the innocent
victims of the 9/11 attacks through a well-regulated legal process.

Law, Justice, and War Crimes Tribunals
The proper venue for working justice in the wake of war is the war
crimes tribunal. That said, it must be admitted that as a means of doing justice,
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courts of law are an imperfect instrument, as are all instruments for the realization of ideals. One of the most commonly raised objections to war crimes trials is
that international tribunals convened, constituted, and conducted by the winning
side necessarily render only “victor’s justice” (a term coined by Herman Goering
to cast aspersions on his Nuremberg trial) on the vanquished, ignoring similar
crimes perpetrated by victorious soldiers and government officials.28 In fact, the
Nuremberg trials, of which Goering complained, could not bring everyone who
had been in some way responsible for war crimes to justice; regrettably, no war
crimes tribunal ever can. And because some will be punished, while others who
have done similar evil, or worse, will go free, the argument raised by Goering and
others against them runs, then it is “unfair” to punish any.
The fatal weakness of Goering’s complaint against “victor’s justice” is
that whether or not Allied soldiers who may have committed war crimes ever came
to trial or were punished, his own crimes were no less atrocious or deserving of
punishment for that; in logical terms, Goering and any other war criminals, Allied
or Axis, were independently culpable on their own (de)merits. Since individual
culpability for atrocities render all war criminals liable, there is no reason why the
inability to punish every one of them should negate the justice of punishing individuals, so long as their punishments are commensurate with their proven responsibility for their alleged crimes. It is hardly an injustice to hold each man
accountable for his own criminal activities, so long as due process is given in all
cases without regard to nationality. It would, however, be unjust to the victims of
atrocity to let the perpetrators of the crimes against them go free on such a cynically jury-rigged technicality as “victor’s justice.” What matters is that an indicted
individual’s crimes be justly judged and punished, not that some statistical standard measure of “fairness”—so many trials and convictions for the victors vice so
many for the vanquished—be arbitrarily set and slavishly adhered to.
More substantive objections have been raised to the effect that international jurisdiction over war crimes tribunals threatens national sovereignty. Nations exist, first and foremost, to secure the human rights of their citizens from
foreign threats. This is why, as Yoram Dinstein puts it, “the prohibition of the use
of force in international relations may be considered the cornerstone of modern
international law.”29 But this cornerstone affords little protection to ethnic and religious minorities when the threat to them comes from a politically powerful faction within their own borders claiming “ethnic cleansing” as its sovereign
national right. If the doing of justice is the underlying purpose of law, then human
rights must weigh heavily against considerations of national sovereignty in such
cases. And, in fact, an exception is made (pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN
Charter) to allow for military intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign
nation when such action is ordained or authorized by the UN Security Council.
Dinstein stresses that however morally justified such intervention may
be, it is legal only when ordained or authorized by the Security Council. But James
Terry concludes from his reading of W. Gary Sharp’s new book on jus paciarii that
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“We may come to regret missing the opportunity
to influence the first permanent tribunal for
war crimes now that it is a fait accompli.”

“existing law and state practice permit a state or collective of states in a regional
organization like NATO to use armed force to prevent genocide and other widespread abuses of human life within its regional boundaries whether Security Council authorization is present or not.”30 Some authors, like Anthony Ellis, believe that
the way to deal with allegations of “victor’s justice” leveled against international
tribunals would be to have each nation try and punish its own war criminals. These,
however, would be vulnerable to similar charges of “unfairness” in cases where
they fail to convict or hand down what the complainants would consider insufficiently severe sentences.31 In any case, the fact that military intervention in a sovereign nation’s internal affairs may be legally permissible, or even mandated, under
certain conditions strongly implies that so may intervention in the form of participation in international war crimes tribunals.
Of particular concern to American lawmakers contemplating our participation in international war crimes trials is the fear that US service members
could be brought up on trumped-up charges leveled against them by jealous or
disgruntled nations, and forced to face prosecution in “kangaroo courts.”32 Accordingly, on 7 December 2001, the US Senate approved, by an overwhelming
vote of 78-2, an amendment to the 2002 Defense Appropriations Bill that would
exempt American service members from prosecution by the International Criminal Court (ICC), which has since been formally established by the ratification of
a 1998 treaty by 60 nations. So great is US concern over the possibility of wrongful prosecution of US troops that the American Service Members Protection Act,
as this amendment is called, even authorizes the use of military force to free any
US service members or government officials detained by that court.
Principal US allies that have ratified this treaty have expressed disappointment at America’s declining to ratify it. There is no reason why either international, or national, war crimes tribunals should necessarily hand down unjust
verdicts. But, considering the suspect intentions and hostile attitudes of some of
the nations (Syria, Sudan, Algeria, Nigeria, etc.) that have acceded to the treaty,
wrongful prosecution of American troops on trumped-up charges by this court
would be a distinct and very troubling possibility. Under such circumstances, our
government’s reservations may be justified. However, we may come to regret
missing the opportunity to influence the first permanent tribunal for war crimes
now that it is a fait accompli. The one-year exemption of US service members
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from prosecution by the ICC, voted 12 July by the UN Security Council in order
to secure continuation of American peacekeeping operations in Bosnia, may be
viewed as a sign that such influence may be exerted to our advantage.
Ironically, similar concerns have been raised about President Bush’s order allowing for trial of suspected foreign terrorists by military tribunals for acts
of war, especially when the accused are not soldiers in the service of an aggressor
nation, making it impossible for us to make a formal declaration of war under current international law. Such courts have much to recommend them—they are mobile and may be conducted on the spot abroad where critical witnesses may be,
and they are more efficient in the process of evidence-gathering and better able to
ensure the security of any classified information presented than are open federal
courts. Although there is no reason why US military tribunals should necessarily
be any less fair than our federal courts, a perception of military tribunals as kangaroo courts has taken hold in the public view.33 Under the circumstances, I must
reluctantly agree with Phil Cave that, although the Supreme Court may uphold
the legality of military tribunals in the context of the war on terrorism should the
issue come before it, “the cases of accused terrorists may be [better] resolved politically by the countries involved. A trial in which the military controls who is
tried and the rules of evidence ‘is like adding fuel to the fire of a bad perception’”;34 the attendant loss of political “currency” may be too great.
Even before they are brought before any court, whether military or civilian, we are faced with the question, which has grown pressing in the past few
months, of how to treat the terrorists we now have in custody at Guantanamo Bay.
Those captured al Qaeda fighters were certainly not innocent civilians. But neither
were they legitimate soldiers. President Bush’s use of the term “unlawful combatants” comes fairly close to an accurate description, but what does that tell us about
how we are to treat them? Under Ancient Roman law, those who fought in a campaign without having legally been sworn into service could be held liable for murder. Like them, the prisoners now in custody at Guantanamo Bay were sworn into
the service of no recognized country; their allegiances appear to be personal and
religious rather than national. One is inclined, following the ancient Roman precedent, to treat them as common murderers, but the US decision to grant them the
protected status of prisoners of war, whether they are legally entitled to it or not, is
best for the sake of public perception; it also provides the advantage of being able
to hold them for the duration of our military operations in Afghanistan.
The international law of war has barely begun to deal with the question
of where to try cases in which the aggressor is a diffuse political or religious entity rather than a nation. But there are precedents on which to draw, and the task is
no more impossible than the development of the law of war to this point has been.
Whatever is decided to be a properly convened, constituted, and conducted court
for such cases, the high moral purpose of jus post bellum—to do justice in the
wake of war—must be well and truly served by them, and must be seen to be so.
Ellis asserts that “the only legitimate aims of punishment must be forward lookAutumn 2002
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ing,” i.e., to incapacitate wrongdoers and deter others from their crimes. I would
say, rather, that in the case of war crimes and crimes against humanity, justice
ought, Janus-like, to look both backward to punish evildoing and, where appropriate, order reparations, as well as looking forward to prevent further crimes of
revenge. Rendering such justice must remain the exclusive prerogative of courts
of law, and must on no account ever be permitted to be taken out into the streets.
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